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Spec.  
Motor  
M-31

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Control 148289  
EIC-M-34 (Revised)

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Minutes of Special Meeting Held in  
Room 1113, Temporary "M" Building  
26th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.

30 March 1954

PRESENT

Dr. Otto E. Guthe, CIA, Chairman

25X1A9a [REDACTED], CIA, Vice Chairman

25X1A9a [REDACTED] CIA

Col. William C. Baird, Air Force

Mr. H. S. Bennett, Navy

Col. Lyman Bothwell, Army

Mr. Bennett Davis, Navy

Mr. John Easton, JCS

Mr. Duncan Holmes, Army

Mr. Clifford Pruefer, Air Force

Mr. Howard Wiedemann, State

25X1A9a [REDACTED], CIA, Executive Secretary

EIC-P-6: ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET BLOC TO SUPPORT A  
GENERAL WAR

1. The meeting was called to discuss action necessitated by the failure of the working group on the subject project to agree to terms of reference, and if possible to reach agreement upon a sufficient number of major points to permit the working group to complete terms of reference.

2. Discussion revealed that there was far more general agreement as to the broad objectives of the study than had been thought, and that much of the difficulty had been the strong feeling of the Army and Navy at working level that the unreality of any estimates of military attrition in the absence of war gaming, bombing, and use of unconventional weapons would make any conclusions unreal for planning or other practical purposes. It was the feeling of the meeting, however, that if the limitations of the study are fully set forth, and if the conclusions are used with corresponding care, the paper should prove worth its cost as a point of departure for more specific studies.

3. The four following major points were agreed upon:

a. The "hot war" war-supporting capabilities would be analyzed, because earlier studies had already dealt with

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Soviet capabilities to maintain military forces up to and including mobilization but have not "crossed the threshold" of estimating support capabilities during hostilities.


b. Selected force levels or a single force level would be assumed and Soviet capabilities to support these would be examined for various time periods (suggested as six months, 12 months and for two to three years).

c. Generalized estimates of combat consumption and attrition would be calculated.

d. The potential accretions to the Soviets would be examined in some detail.

4. The draft terms of reference, dated 5 February 1954, were returned to the working group for such modification as necessary; a redrafted terms of reference is to be submitted by 12 April to the EIC members, for discussion in the EIC meeting on 20 April.

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Executive Secretary  
Economic Intelligence Committee

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